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 he short answer to this question is: No, actually. But the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa) have achieved such impact in the global media 
that  one  might  think  so.  A  deeper  consideration  of  this  notion  is  therefore 
warranted.  
The initial branding of the acronym by Goldman Sachs for the purpose of marketing 
investment vehicles has been taken up enthusiastically by the governments forming a 
joint  pressure  group  to  achieve  more  power  in  international  affairs.  Their  political 
branding is also clear: as an alternative leadership group to the old West, and a form of 
protest against the old hegemony of the US and the disproportionate ranking of Europe 
in multilateral organisations. But this hardly means that other global players, notably 
the  EU  and  the  US,  should  treat  the  BRICS  as  a  bloc  in  substantive  international 
relations. 
Having  now  admitted  South  Africa  to  their  company,  the  BRICS  evidently  seek  to 
further enhance their brand image and their claims to represent the world outside the 
old West. The addition of South Africa  makes for more coherence with the IBSA group 
(India, Brazil, and the South Africa Dialogue Forum), which is a less conspicuous group 
branding themselves as the ‘vibrant democracies’ of all three continents – Africa, Asia 
and  Latin  America  –  of  the  developing  world,  and  thus  marking  an  initial 
differentiation  with  the  BRICS.  Of  the  two  groups,  IBSA,  as  the  more  functionally 
advanced, is clearly working for the cause of South-South cooperation. 
These questions can be tested by looking at how the BRICS and IBSA have attempted to 
organise themselves, by considering basic indicators of their structural commonalities 
or divergences of interests, their most recent summit declarations and the positions they 
have adopted on substantive issues. 
Both groups have been making energetic efforts to institutionalise themselves. The BRICS 
have  announced,  but not  yet  really  implemented,  an  extensive  bureaucratisation  of  their 
activities, underpinning annual summit meetings with an Action Plan of ministerial or senior 
official meetings for foreign affairs, finance, trade, health, agriculture, competition policy, 
and security, and with forums for business, securities exchanges, urbanisation, infrastructure 
and cities. IBSA also has its annual summits spaced between (rather than next to) the BRICS’ 
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summits, and its bureaucratic processes and cooperation programmes are more operational 
than those announced by the BRICS.  
But  what  do  these  groups  really  have  in  common?  Table  1,  below,  offers  a menu  of six 
demographic, political and economic criteria. Table 2 adds data on their voting power in the 
Executive Board of the IMF, alongside GDP data. 
Together the BRICS have weight, for sure. In 2011 their economies amounted to $13.2 trillion 
in GDP; close to that of the US ($15.1 trillion) and the EU ($17.6 trillion) or the eurozone 
($13.1  trillion).  In  a  few  years  time  they  will  be  bigger  still.  The  IBSA  added  up  to 
considerably less ($4.6 trillion), and China alone: $7,298 billion.  
Our six indicators concern population size, GDP per capita rank, structural economic facts 
(commodity or manufacturing, external creditor or debtor, current account surplus of deficit, 
exchange rate regime), and political factors (democracy or not, permanent membership of 
the UN Security Council or not). 
The striking fact to emerge is that whereas the IBSA countries have a lot in common, in the 
case of the BRICS this is much less the case. In fact, looking at the six indicators in Table 1, 
there is not one where all the BRICS are on the same page. They might all be considered 
large in terms of population size if South Africa is honoured with the task of representing all 
of Africa, which informally seems to be the case. None of the BRICS is in the top rank of GDP 
per capita, but Russia is hardly a developing country. The IBSA, on the other hand, are all 
developing countries, all are democracies, all have current account deficits and net debtor 
positions, all have floating exchange rates, and all are without permanent seats on the UN 
Security Council, as opposed to both China and Russia in all these respects (except that only 
China has a controlled exchange rate).  
The  significance  of  these  simple  facts  becomes  apparent  when  one  examines  the  recent 
summit declarations of the BRICS and IBSA. At their fourth summit in Delhi on 29 March 
2012, the BRICS adopted a long Declaration and an Action Plan.1 Like many declarations to 
emerge from summits of the G20, G8, the EU and other multilateral events including IBSA, 
there  is  much  in  the  BRICS’  language  that  belongs  to  the  ‘motherhood  and  apple  pie’ 
category, i.e. aspirational statements that all can agree to but which have little operational 
significance. So much for the BRICS’ objectives of “peace, security and development in a 
multi-polar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex globalising world” … “on the basis of 
universally  recognised  norms  of  international  law  and  multilateral  decision-making” 
(although this multilateral aspect sits ambiguously alongside their championing of multi-
polarity).     
At their fifth summit in Pretoria on 18 October 2011, the IBSA Declaration bears comparison 
with that of the BRICS.2 Whether a merit or not, the IBSA Declaration is twice as long as that 
of the BRICS, also containing much from the ‘motherhood and apple pie’ school. The most 
striking difference is found in the statement of IBSA’s objectives, as “three large pluralistic, 
multi-cultural  and  multi-racial  societies”,  with  “a  shared  vision  …  that  democracy  and 
development  are mutually  reinforcing  and key to  sustainable  peace  and  stability”.  Their 
leaders are willing “to share, if requested, the democratic and inclusive development model 
of their societies with countries in transition to democracy”– an offer the EU will heartily 
encourage.      
                                                   
1  Fifth  BRICS  Summit,  Delhi  Declaration,  20  March  2012 
(http://www.mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=190019162). 
2  Fifth  IBSA  Summit  –  Tshwane  Declaration,  18  October  2011 
(http://netindian.in/news/2011/10/18/00016616/fifth-ibsa-summit-tshwane-declaration). 
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The  first  more  operational  argument  in  the  BRICS  Delhi Declaration  concerns  the  global 
macroeconomic  situation,  with  justifiable  satisfaction  over  their  own  countries’  relatively 
rapid recovery from the global crisis, contrasting with the risks to the global economy now 
posed  by  the  eurozone  crisis.  The  BRICS  admonish  the  “advanced  economies  to  adopt 
responsible macroeconomic and financial policies”. Yes indeed - as a general proposition. 
But  then  the  BRICS  move  the  argument  on  with  much  more  specific  and  dubious 
propositions, criticising the “excessive liquidity from the aggressive policy actions taken by 
central banks” (presumably they have in mind the quantitative easing of the Fed and Bank of 
England, and the long-term repo operation (LTRO) of the European Central Bank, although 
they do not say so directly). The complaint is that these actions spill over into the emerging 
market economies with excessive volatility of capital flows and commodity prices.  
While  there  are  issues  here  of  real  concern,  the  basic  argument  of  the  BRICS  loses 
plausibility, and fails to ask where the global economy would be without these huge macro-
financial recovery operations. The answer would surely be a global depression and financial 
disruption of cataclysmic proportions, rendering the concerns they expressed about capital 
flows and commodity prices a secondary matter. So the BRICS have not really worked out a 
valid  common  line  here.  Brazil  has  been  leading  the  charge  about  unwelcome  capital 
inflows, with adverse consequences for its industrial competitiveness through exchange rate 
appreciation. But the position of the BRICS is disingenuous, since it entirely evades the core 
global issue of Chinese super-competitivity and the distortions to the global economy that 
result from its controlled exchange rate. One can understand why the BRICS could not agree 
to address these issues, but that hardly solves the problem. IBSA countries have a common 
interest in Chinese exchange rate appreciation, as does the EU.  
The BRICS go on to lament the slow pace of quota and governance reforms at the IMF and 
World Bank, while welcoming “the candidatures from the developing world for the position 
of  President  of  the  World  Bank”  (of  course  this  is  the  text  dating  from  mid-March).           
Their argument about the slow pace of quota reform can be objectively justified, as the data 
in Table 2 show. GDP weight may not be the only economic criterion, and weight in world 
trade  and  finance  are  relevant  too.  Yet  the  extent  to  which  the  EU  is  overweight  is 
substantial, and uniquely so amongst the advanced economies since the weight of the US is 
not  obviously  out  of  line.  There  is  a  second  apparent  distortion  if  GDP  weights  are  the 
criterion: many small developing countries seem to be overweight too, as illustrated by the 
voting power of the constituency of which South Africa is a member, alongside 21 smaller 
other African countries. However the complaint of the big BRICS is now heightened by the 
financial contributions of countries outside the EU to the recent doubling (by $430 billion) in 
IMF resources that are intended as a firewall against the eurozone crisis. The new major 
financial powers claim to have a say over the conditions for the use of this money, and 
doubly so since the US and Canada have contributed nothing.  
As regards the World Bank’s election of its new president, the developing world produced 
two serious candidates, from Nigeria and Colombia, and as the selection process advanced 
the Colombian desisted in favour of the Nigerian, as a token of developing world solidarity. 
At one stage Russia said that it reserved its position in the interest of arriving at a common 
BRICS position. The African continent voted en bloc for the Nigerian candidate, and Brazil 
added its support. But then China, India and Russia voted for the Asian-born American 
candidate. So the BRICS were divided, and their majority voted for the American contender. 
Why was that? Was it that the Asians could not accept an African president? Or was it that 
they  did  not  want  to  embarrass  Obama?  Even  if  the  voting  power  of  the  West  assured 
election of the American candidate, the BRICS failed to seize the opportunity to make an 
impressive political statement together, and IBSA also failed to achieve unity.  4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Turning to trade policy, the BRICS join company with the G20 and the EU in expressing 
hopes for “the successful conclusion of the Doha Round”, while showing a willingness to 
explore outcomes in specific areas. However, more pointedly they criticise the “plurilateral 
initiatives  that  go  against  the  fundamental  principles  of  transparency,  inclusiveness  and 
multilateralism”.  This  is  not  made  more  explicit  but  would  seem  to  refer  to  the  2011 
Singapore Anti-Counterfeit Trade Agreement (ACTA), signed by the EU, the US and other 
advanced  market  economies,  and  ongoing  negotiations  on  a  service  agreement  by  16 
countries. But their complaint invites the response that BRICS itself is a plurilateral initiative. 
Within the BRICS it is striking that China and Russia have experienced the same level of 
major  surpluses  on  current  account  over  the  last  seven  years  (6.6%  of  GDP  on  annual 
average), whereas the three IBSA countries are all deficit economies that import capital.  
On climate change, the BRICS quite reasonably congratulate South Africa on the successful 
outcome of the Durban Conference in December 2011, and confirm their commitment to 
contributing to the global effort under the auspices of the UNFCCC, while retaining their 
clear markers about developed countries accepting special responsibilities and not capping 
development. 
Like so many other summit declarations, the BRICS go through the standard current list of 
security concerns, with advocacy of peaceful outcomes for the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria, 
Iran, Afghanistan, etc., but without substantial positions of note. On Syria, however, both 
China and Russia initially adopted blocking positions in response to draft resolutions put to 
the UN Security Council, which was seen as Russia protecting Assad. This position became 
diplomatically unsustainable, however, and eventually these two countries joined a UNSC 
consensus in support of the Annan Plan. The BRICS are struggling with the tensions between 
the doctrines of ‘non-interference’ and ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). Brazil is currently 
taking an initiative in the UN under the heading: “Responsibility while protecting” to try to 
refine R2P and ensure the adequate implementation of such actions following the Libyan 
case. 3 This could become an example of norm-building that both IBSA and the EU might 
work towards together. 
The BRICS  
reaffirm the need for comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council … and 
China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of Brazil, India and South 
Africa in international affairs and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN.  
However the reader will note that China and Russia could not declare explicit support for 
the concrete demands of the three IBSA states for permanent membership of the Security 
Council.  China  presumably  remains  reticent  towards  India’s  claims.  Unsurprisingly,  the 
IBSA explicitly advance their own claims for permanent Security Council membership.   
There  are  two  fields,  trade and  development  finance,  where  the  BRICS are  preparing  or 
discussing concrete action. Trade ministers have reached a Master Agreement on Extending 
Credit Facility in Local Currency, which is diplomatic language for extending the use of the 
renminbi  in  their  mutual  trade,  since  the  other  currencies  are  unlikely  to  get  far  in 
international  finance.  A  new  development  bank  for  infrastructure  and  sustainable 
development  projects  is  being  considered,  with  finance  ministers  tasked  to  explore  its 
feasibility and report back to the next summit, to be hosted by South Africa in 2013.  
The collective financial fire power of the BRICS is of course huge, but the weight of China 
predominates. The idea is that such a bank should fund projects not only in the BRICS but 
also in other emerging and developing countries. This BRIC development bank idea poses 
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the strategic question, for China in particular, of how it is going to deploy its economic and 
financial power in the world, and more precisely in the balance between backing up the 
global multilateral institutions versus developing institutions in which it will be the major 
actor. The next BRICS summit is due to be more informative on this point when it reports on 
the ‘feasibility’ of the BRICS development bank.   
In conclusion, the overall scorecard of BRICS and IBSA performance thus far looks like this: 
  Impressive  declarations  to  develop  the  apparatus  of  both  BRICS  and  IBSA 
cooperation across a comprehensive range of sectors, with the evident objective of 
achieving synergies in their collective influence in world affairs, but with uncertain 
implementation so far; 
  Clear emphasis on democratic political values by IBSA, compared to the silence of the 
BRICS on this account; 
  Easy adoption by both BRICS and IBSA of language criticising the behaviour of the 
‘advanced’ countries, and general espousal of the causes of emerging and developing 
countries; and of support for conventional aspirational positions on topical foreign 
and security issues; 
  Stumbling  by  the  BRICS  over  several  major  international  issues  that  are  concrete 
operationally (disingenuous criticisms of Western macro-financial policies, failure of 
solidarity over the World Bank presidency and UN Security Council membership, 
divisions over security policy norms in the case of Syria), reflecting fault lines in their 
ranks; better coherence of the IBSA; and 
  Opening  of  consideration  of  one  potentially  very  important  initiative  (BRICS 
development bank), which will be a test case revealing how China intends to deploy 
its formidable financial strength in international affairs.  
The  open  question  is  how  far  the  BRICS  and/or  IBSA  will  strengthen  their  activity  in 
operational  terms,  or  discover  increasing  divergences  when  trying  to  move  beyond 
declarations. There are many cross-cutting alliances or alignments of different BRICSs and 
IBSAs with each other and with various parts of the West, including on major economic, 
financial and trade policies, and on issues of foreign policy norms that link to matters of 
domestic political values.  
The EU has natural political affinities with the IBSA, but they have not translated so far into 
any  special  political  relationship,  and  this  is  a question  for  the  future.  The  IBSA have  a 
plausible  future  as  a  de  facto  leadership  group  of  democratically-oriented  developing 
countries. However, the IBSA for their part will not want to break with the huge economic 
and  financial  clout  of  China,  which  may  become  the  glue  holding  the  BRICS  together, 
notwithstanding their many divergences.  
It  is  going  to  take  time  for  these  various  cross-cutting  positions  to shape  up.  There  is a 
complex process of diplomatic exploration and testing now underway. The EU can do this 
through its comprehensive set of so-called Strategic Partnerships with each of the BRICS 
bilaterally. It would be premature to regard either the BRICS or the IBSA as a bloc. However 
the  BRICS  are  likely  to  be  united  in  their  complaint  about  under-representation  in 
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one can expect that ideas such as the BRICS development bank to advance as alternatives. 
Indeed the mere discussion of the idea can be seen as a negotiating gambit over power in the 
global multilateral institutions. This is a strategic reality that confronts EU member states 
that wish to conserve their overrepresented national positions in the global institutions. The 
case for consolidated EU seats in the major multilateral institutions, with a lower aggregate 
voting weight compared to the present, has an obvious logic. What begins to become clearer 
is  how  in  practice  the  conservative  denial  of  this  logic  by  EU  member  states  will  work 
against the EU’s declared interest in vibrant multilateralism.  
This is just one more instance of where some real European leadership is now needed. The 
BRICS and IBSA may not be blocs, but they do pose concrete strategic issues for the EU. 
 
Table 1. Basic economic and political indicators for the BRICS 
  China  Russia  India  Brazil  South Africa 
Population size  Huge  Large  Huge  Large  Medium 
GDP p.c. rank  92  53  129  75  78 
Net external creditor  Massive +  Large +  Large -  Small -  Small - 
Current account, % GDP  +6.6  +6.6  -1.9  -1.0  -4.6 
Commodity exporter  Minor  Predominant  Minor  Major  Major 
Exchange rate regime  Controlled  Float  Float  Float  Float 
UNSC permanent 
member 
Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
IBSA/democratic  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Current account = Data for 2005 to 2011, annual average. 
IBSA = India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum. 
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Table 2. Voting power in the IMF after 2010 reform 
 
Position in the 
Executive Board 
% vote of the 
constituency 
inside the EB 
Components of the 
constituency 
 
GDP, 2011 
Billion $ 
Brazil  Leader of 
constituency  
    2.8   9 South/Central 
American/Caribbean 
states 
Constituency 3,000 
(Brazil 2,482) 
 
Russia  Single 
membership 
    2.3   -  1,850 
India  Leader of 
constituency  
    2.8  4 South Asian states  Constituency 1,849 
(India 1,676) 
 
China  Single 
membership 
    3.8   -  7,298 
South Africa  Member of 
constituency 
    3.2  21 African states  Constituency 1,009 
(South Africa 408) 
 
Total BRICS    15    13,157 
United States  Single 
membership 
16    15,094 
EU 
(Eurozone) 
Single members & 
constituencies 
30 
(21) 
  17,577 
(13,115) 
Japan  Single 
membership 
6    5,869 
Other G20  Constituencies  12    8,135 
Other   Constituencies  21    9,827 
World    100    69,659 
Note: the leaders of the Executive Board’s constituencies cast a single consolidated vote on behalf of 
all members.   
Sources for GDP data: World Economic Outlook, IMF. 
 
 
 